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BILLS AND NOTES-CoNDITIONAL DELIVERY-ADMISSIBILITY OF PAROL Evi-
DENcE-The plaintiff, indorsee of a promissory note, sued the defendants as ac-
commodation indorsers. The defendants offered to prove by parol evidence a
contemporaneous oral agreement with the maker, of which the payee bank had
notice, that the note should not become operative until indorsed by certain others,
which never.occurred. Held: Evidence properly admitted to show conditional
delivery. Towlc-Jamieson Co. v. Brannan, 205 N. NV. 699 (Minn., 1925).
The rule is well settled that parol evidence is not admissible to vary or con-
tradict the terms of a negotiable instrument. I DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRU-
MENTS, § 8o (6th ed. 1913). Thus it has been held that, even as between the
immediate parties, evidence may not be admitted to show an agreement not to
enforce payment, or to limit the liabilities of the parties; Wood v. Surrells, 89
I1. io7 (1878); Remington v Detroit Mfg. Co., 101 Wis. 307, 77 N. V. 178
(1898) ; or that the instrument was not to be negotiated, but renewed; Waddle
V. Ozen, 43 Neb. 489, 61 N. XV. 731 (1895) ; Heist v. Hart, 73 Pa. 286 (1873) ;
or that it was to be payable to someone other than the person named therein as
payee; Draper v. Rice, 56 Iowa 114, 7 N. AV. 524 (1881) ; Strachan, v. Mfuxlow,
.24 Wis. 21 (1869) ; or that the date of maturity was different from that ex-
pressed on the face of the note. Crooker -. Hamilton, 3 Ga. App. I9o, 59 S. E.
722 (i907) ; fallory s. Fitzgerald, 69 Neb. 312, 95 N. 'V. 6oi (19o3). In one
recent case, evidence introduced to show an agreement as to what was to be done
with a note after delivery was excluded by the court, on the ground that the
agreement was not a condition precedent to the obligation on the note, and, the
note being valid, the terms could not be varied. Sillinan Ty. Dobner, 2o5 N. W.
696 (Minn., 1925).
Parol evidence, however, may always be introduced in an action between the
immediate parties or those taking with notice to show that no obligation ever
arose from the writing. Norman z'. McCarthy, s6 Colo. 290, 138 Pac. 28
(1914) ; Niblock v. Sprague, 2oo N. Y. 390, 93 N. E. io5' (i91i). Hence the
rule first mentioned is not so broad as it would at first seem, and the problem
in each case narrows down to whether the contemporaneous agreement is one
which does, in effect, vary the terms of the instrument, or one which shows that
the instrument purporting to be a contract is in fact no contract at all.
Thus, extrinsic evidence is admissible against an original party or one hav-
ing notice, to show a lack of consideration; Independent Brewing Assn. v. Klet,
114 Ill. App. 1 (1904) ; Aldrich v. Wliitaker, 7o N. H. 627, 47 AtL 591 (i9oo),
(unless defendant is an accommodation party; N. L L., § 29) ; or a failure of
consideration; Holmes v. Farris, 97 Mo. App. 305, 71 S. V. 16 (r9o2) ; Faux
v. Fitter, 223 Pa. 568, 72 Atl. 89i (io9); or that the note was merely evi-
dence of an advancement made by the payee to the maker, both parties intending
the note not to be binding; Storey v. Storey, 214 Fed. 973 (C. C. A., z914) ;
Brook v. Latiner, 44 Kan. 431, 24 Pac. 946 (i89o) ; Bond v. Vandergrift, 128
N. Y. Supp. io78 (i9ii). Contra: Dickson v. Harris, 6o Iowa 727, 13 N. XV.
335 (1883) ; Billings v,. Billings, 64 Mass. 178 (1852) ; Estate of Vininreid,
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16s Wis. 63, i6o N. W. io64 (1917) ; or that the note was given as collateral
security for other liability; Lippincott v. Lawrie, 119 Wis. 573, 97 N. V. 179
(1903).
There was some uncertainty before the Negotiable Instruments Law, as to
whether it might be shown that the delivery of a note was conditional; Henshaw
v. Dutton, 59 1Mo. 139 (1875) ; but the general rule seems to have been well
established that parol evidence indicating that the note was to become operative
only on the occurrence of a condition did not vary or contradict the terms of
the instrument, since, if there had been no valid delivery, no obligation ever
arose. Corbin v. Sistrunk, i9 Ala. 203 (i85i) ; Watkins v. Bowers, 119 Mass.
383 (1875) ; Burke v. Dulaney, 153 U. S. 228 (1893). Section 16 of the N. 1. L.
merely codified that existing rule. Selna Sa-zings Bank v. Harlan, 167 Iowa
673, 149 N. V. 882 (1914) ; Hill v. Hall, 19! Mass. 253, 77 N. E. 831 (19o6);
Seattle National Bank v. Becker, 74 Wash. 43!, 133 Pac. 613 (1913).
The defendants in the instant case did not endeavor to vary or contradict
the terms of the note by showing that their liability was different from that indi-
cated on the face of the note. They sought instead to prove that they were not
liable upon it at all, because the note had never been delivered to the payee as a
binding obligation. It would seem, therefore, that the evidence was properly
admitted.
CON sTITUTIONAL LAW-EXTENT OF FEDERAL TAXING POWER-FUTURE
TRADING AcT-Under protest, the plaintiff paid a tax imposed by § 3 of the
Future Trading Act of ig2i, 42 Stat 187, providing for a tax of twenty cents
on every bushel of grain involved in certain options for contracts of purchase
or sale of grain. Claiming the section is unconstitutional, the plaintiff now
seeks to recover the sum thus paid. Held: § 3 is unconstitutional. Trusler v.
Crooks, 46 Sup. Ct. 165 (U. S., 1926).
Other sections of this act have been declared unconstitutional. Hill v.
Wallace, 259 U. S. 44 (1922). In that case there was a strong dictum that
§ 3 was constitutional. In reliance thereon, the lower court held for the de-
fendant, in 3oo Fed. 996 (D. C., i924). Not very convincingly, Mr. Justice
McReynolds now explains that the court was not indulging in dictum, but was
rather limiting the decision then announced to the sections then under con-
sideration. Though perhaps unexpected, the decision nevertheless seems jus-
tifiable. The court finds that the tax comes within the doctrine of the Child
Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20 (1922), that when a revenue act is "on its
face" intended as a regulatory measure and not to raise revenue, it will be
held invalid when such regulation is outside the powers of Congress. The
consideration for such options for many years has been invariably one dollar
per thousand bushels. Since the tax is twenty cents per bushel, its practical
effect is to prohibit all uch options. Clearly no revenue could ever be ex-
pected under a levy that destroyed the thing taxed, and the court is thus left
with the only alternative of declaring that the tax must have been intended
as a regulation. This view does not, it is submitted, deny the rule laid down
in the Child Labor Tax Case, supra, that the court cannot infer solely from
the heavy burden of the tax that a prohibition was really intended, for here
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there was another element-the total destruction by the tax of the thing taxed.
Moreover, as the court points out, this section is intimately related to sections
already held invalid. Certainly the view of the lower court would make it
difficult to explain how this section passed judicial scrutiny when the accom-
panying sections could not.
COXSTITUTIO.AL LAV-SALE OF TICKETS-REGULATION BY STATE-The
Pennsylvania Act of igg, P. L. 1oo3, Pa. St. i92o, § 2o197, amended by the
Act of 1921, P. L. 997, Pa. St. Supp. 1924, § 20197, forbids the sale of steam-
ship tickets without a license and stipulates the following qualifications: that
the applicant be of good moral character, have the authorized agency for three
or more companies, pay an annual fee of fifty dollars, and be bonded against
fraud or misrepresentation in the sum of $iooo. Convicted under this statute,
the defendant appealed on the ground that it contravenes the commerce clause
of the Federal Constitution. Held: The statute is constitutional. Common-
wealth v. Disanto, _-85 Pa. 1, 131 Ad. 489 (r925).
This decision reverses Com. v. Disanto, 85 Pa. Super. 149 (1925), which
has already been discussed. Ste 74 U. or PA. L. REv. 93 (1925). In holding
that the statute imposes no direct burden upon foreign commerce and that it
is a reasonable regulation within the police power of the state, the instant case
is in accord with the views there suggested.
CO.-cSTITUTIO'.AL LAW-VALIDITY OF THE UNIFRm DECLARATORY JUDG-
MENTS Acr-Petitioner, whose title to certain mineral property had been ques-
tioned by the proposed lessee, asked for a judgment as to his property rights
under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act of 1923, P. L. 84o, Pa. St. Supp.
1924, §128o5a. All interested parties were joined. From a decree declaring
that the petitioner possessed a fee absolute in an undivided one-third of the
minerals, the proposed lessee appealed attacking, inter alia, the constitutionality
of the Act. Held: The Act is constitutional. Decree reversed on the merits.
Kariher's Petition (No. 1), 284 Pa. 455, 131 Atl. 265 (1925).
For the history and scope of declaratory judgments, see Borchard, The
Declaratory Judgment-A Needed Procedural Reform, 28 YALE L. J. I, 1o5
(1918) ; Sunderland, A fodern Evolution in Remedial Rights-The Declara-
tory Judgment, 16 MICH. L REv. 69 (1917). See also Borchard, The Uniform
Act on Declaratory Judgments, 34 HARV. L. REv. 697 (i92!).
In the case of Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry., 211 Mich. 592, 179 N. W.
350 (192o), a statute providing for declaratory judgments was declared un-
constitutional, on the ground that it cast a non-judicial duty upon the courts.
As pointed out in Kariher's Petition. supra, the case was not a proper one for
a declaratory judgment, and was decided upon the authority of Gordon v.
United States, 2 Wall. 561 (U. S., 1864), 117 U. S. 702 (1885), and Mfuskrat
21. United States, 219 U. S. 346 (1911), both of which involved moot cases.
The court failed to see the distinction between such cases and declaratory
judgments. The decision has been severely criticized. See 73 U. OF PA. L.
RE. 100 (1923) ; 21 CO. L. Ray. x68 (:921) ; 6 A. B. A. JouL 145 (1920) ;
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7 Ibid. 141 (1921) ; i9 MicH. L. REV. 86 (i92o) ; 5 Mi-x. L. Rzv. 172 (1921) ;
30 YALE L. J. x61 (1920) and note in 12 A. L. R. 52. The instant case is in
accord with the great weight of authority. Blakeslee v. Wilson, 190 Cal. 213,
213 Pac. 495 (1923) ; Brannan v. Babcock, 98 Conn. 459, 12o At. i5o (1923) ;
State v. Grove, 1o9 Kan. 61g, 201 Pac. 82 (1gx); Board of Education v.
VanZandt, io9 'Misc. 124, 195 N. Y. Supp. 297 (1922), aff'd. in 234 N. Y. 644,
138 N. E. 481 (1923) ; Miller v,. Miller, 149 Tenn. 463, 261 S. W. 965 (I9-4).
The question of the validity of the Uniform Act which has now been
adopted in six other states was first presented in Miller v. Miller, supra, where
it was held constitutional. Karlher's Petition, supra, is the second and better
considered case involving this Act.
Mr. Chief Justice von Moschzisker points out the wide difference between
an advisory opinion, where the facts are imaginary, and a declaratory judg-
ment, which can be given only where there is a real controversy, and which
constitutes res judicata. He points out that where adverse litigants are present
in court, and there is a real controversy between them, a final decision ren-
dered in any form of proceeding of which the court has jurisdiction is a judg-
ment, whether or not it is followed by execution. The argument that the whole
theory of the declaratory judgment is an unallowable innovation he answers by
citing many instances where courts are constantly making decisions under
established procedural forms which are in effect declaratory judgments. More-
over, it is decided that the establishment of this new procedural form does not
violate the due process clause of the Constitution, since the elements necessary
to the protection of the interests of all -parties are preserved. Hagar -. Rec-
lanzaion Dist., Iii U. S. 7oi (x883) ; Hurtado v. California, iio U. S. 5x6
(1883). Nor does it deny the right of trial by jury, since the Act itself (§ 8)
provides for the submission to a jury of any issue of fact. Where a declaratory
judgment statute did not contain such a specific provision, it was nevertheless
construed as requiring a jury trial of questions of fact. Miles v. Strong, 68
Conn. 273, 36 Aft. ss (x86).
The decision in Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry., supra, cast a cloud over
the progress of the declaratory judgment. If any wisps of doubt remain, they
should be cleared away by the opinion of the court in the instant case.
CRIMixAL LAw-INDEFINITF SUsPENsION oF Sa.-rExcE-PowEaR or CoUxR
-The defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of violating the liquor laws and
was sentenced to one year in the penitentiary. The court ordered that the ex-
ecution of the sentence be stayed provided the defendant did not subsequently
violate the liquor laws. Held: The suspension of the execution of the sen-
tence was for an indefinite period and beyond the power of the court. State
v. Davis, 277 S. W. 5 (Ark., 1925).
It is generally conceded that courts have the power to suspend sentence
or its execution temporarily or for a reasonable time in order to consider
pending motions for appeals and new trials, or to review the judgment or pro-
ceedings supplemental to it. Ex .parte United States, 242 U. S. 27 (x916);
Ragland v. State, 55 Fla. 157, 46 So. 724 (108); People v. Reilly, 53 Mich.
26, 18 N. NV. 849 (1884). This seems to be a common law power always
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exercised by the courts. 4 BL. CoN. 394; CHITTY, CRITINAL LAW, 758 (i816);
2 HALE P. C., 412 (Ed. 1847).
There is, however, a conflict among the decisions as to whether a court
has power to suspend a sentence or stay its execution for an indefinite period.
The majority view, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, is that courts
are denied this right upon the grounds that the power to exercise discretion
as to the enforcement of punishment provided by law and pronounced by the
court is vested in the executive branch of the government and not in the judi-
ciary; and this power, if exercised by the courts, would be a serious infringe-
ment upon the prerogative of the Governor to reprieve and pardon. Tanner
T,. Wiggils, 54 Fla. 203, 45 So. 459 (i9o7) ; People v. Allen, 155 Ill. 6x, 39
N. E. 568 (1895) ; State v. Sapp, 87 Kan. 740, 125 Pac. 78 (1912). Suspension
of sentence during the good behavior of the defendant is a suspension for an
indefinite period. Norman v. Rehberg, 1. Ga. App. 698, 28 S. F_. 256 (1913);
Spenser v. State, 125 Tenn. 64, 140 S. W. 597 (1911) ; Reese v. Olsen, 44 Utah
318, 139 Pac. 941 (1914). The Federal rule is in accord with this view. Ex
porte United States, supra; United States v. Wilson, 46 Fed. 748 (C. C., i8gi).
A respectable minority, however, has held, either directly or indirectly,
that a sentence may be indefinitely suspended by a court. Commonwealth v.
Dowdican, i15 Mass. 133 (1874); State v. Drew, 75 N. H. 402, 74 At]. 875
(1909); People v. Ct. of Sessions, 141 N. Y. 288, 136 N. E. 386 (1894).
These courts base their decisions on an enlarged interpretation of the common
law rule that the power to suspend belongs by common right to every tribunal
invested with authority to award execution in a criminal case. It is, however,
submitted that while a court has the power to enforce its own orders, it has
not the power to refuse to do so permanently; and an indefinite suspension
is the legal equivalent of an absolute and permanent refusal to execute sen-
tence.
Undoubtedly, it is often desirable for a court to have a discretionary power
of suspension, and, realizing this, many states have by statute vested such a
power in the courts with varying limitations. By the weight of authority
these statutes are constitutional. Re Giannini, 18 Cal. App. 166, 122 Pac. 831
(1912) ; Ex parte Bates, 2o N. M. 542, i51 Pac. 698 (1915); State v. Malahan,
65 Wash. 287, xi8 Pac. 42 (1911). Contra: Summnerfield v. Moran, 43 Nev.
i5o, 182 Pac. 927 (1979); see State v. Dalton, 1O9 Tenn. 544, 72 S. W. 456
(192o).
CRIMINAL LAW-JRISDIcrION---OBTAINI.G MONEY BY FRAUD--TELEGAPH
COMPANY AS AGENT-The defendant sent a telegram from California to Ham-
mond in Utah, falsely stating that the sender was Hammond's son, and asking
him to telegraph the sender money in California. Hammond did so. The de-
fendant was arrested, and is now tried in Utah for obtaining money by fraud.
The defense is that, the telegraph company paid the money to defendant
in California, the crime was there committed, and the court in Utah has no
jurisdiction. Held: Utah has jurisdiction, because the telegraph company is
defendant's agent to receive the money, and he therefore received it in Utah.
State v. Devot, 242 Pac. 395 (Utah, 1925).
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The general rule is that the crime of obtaining property 
or money under
false pretenses is consummated where the property or 
money is obtained, rather
than where the pretenses are made. Burton v. United States, 
196 U. S. 283
(o195) ; Graham v. People, 181 Ill. 477, 55 N. E. 179 (3899) 
; Slate v. House. 55
Iowa 466, 8 N. W. 307 (i88i). But where, induced by 
false pretenses, one
transmits money or drafts by mail, or goods by carrier, the 
postmaster or carrier
acts as agent for the addressee, so that delivery to the postmaster 
or carrier
is a delivery to him, and the venue is properly laid in 
the county in which the
goods are so delivered. Connion-wealth v. Wood, 142 Mass. 149, 8 N. E. 
432
(1886) ; Commonwealtl v. Karpowski, 167 Pa. 225, -3 Ad. 
572 (1895).
However, as is so forcibly pointed out in the dissenting 
opinion, the in-
stant case does not properly fall under the above 
rules. It differs from the
cases cited above in that the sender gives the telcgraph 
company title to the
money, not as agent for the sendee, but absolutely, 
and the company merely
obligates itself to pay an equivalent amount to the 
sendee, rather than the
identical money delivered to it by the sender. In 
other words, the relation
so created is not one of agency, but that of an independent 
contractor. Eureka
C. M. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 88 S. C. 498, 70 S. E. 
1040 (1911). Under
this theory, the defendant would not obtain the money 
until it was actually
delivered into his hands, in California, and hence Utah 
would have no juris-
diction. This would seem to be the better view in 
such cases since it eliminates
the fiction of agency, which should not usually be employed 
to give a court
jurisdiction in criminal cases.
DIvORCF-FRAUD IN SECURING DEcREE-EFFECT 
OF DEATn-The plaintiff
obtained a decree of divorce from the defendant. 
After the plaintiff's death,
the defendant brought a motion to set aside 
the judgment, proving that there
was no service of process, and that plaintiff's 
affidavit for publication of sum-
mons was false. Held: The decree could be 
set aside even though one party
was dead, by a motion to set aside the judgment. 
Fowler v. Fowler, 19o N. C.
536, 130 S. E. 315 (1925).
The majority of jurisdictions hold that a divorce 
decree may be set aside
even after the complainant's death, where it 
was obtained by fraud on the
part of the complainant, or without due service 
of process. Lima v. Lima, 26
Cal. App. 1, i47 Pac. 233 (1914); Zoellner v. Zoellner, 
46 Mich. 511, 9 N. NV.
831 (881) ; Bay v. Bay, 85 Ohio 417, 98 N. 
E. io9 (1912). Pennsylvania fol-
lows this rule. Boyd's Appeal, 38 Pa. 241 (1861 
; Fidelity Ins. Co. Appeal,
93 Pa. 242 (1880) ; Gambe v. Gainbe, 22 Pa. 
C. C. 23 (1868). Two states
have held otherwise-that an action for divorce is 
purely personal, and that
upon the death of either party the subject matter 
of the action is eliminated
and a decree of divorce cannot be thereafter set aside. Lieber 
v. Lieber, 239
Mo. i, 143 S. NV. 458 (igiz); Dwyer v. Nolan, 40 
Wash. 459, 82 Pac. 746
(19o5).
Among the states allowing the decree to be set aside, 
there is some di-
versity as to the procedure. Some hold that the remedy 
is by a new action
to set aside the decree, since the original action was terminated 
by the death
of one party, and that any rights affected by the decree 
could not be consid-
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ered on motion, because the proper parties interested in the property were not
made parties. Dallas -. Luster, 27 N. D. 450, 147 N. W. 95 (914); Clay v.
Robertson, 30 Okla. 758, 12o Pac. io2 (1912). California holds, in accord
with the principal case, that a decree obtained without due service may be
vacated on a motion in the original cause, because the decree affects the prop-
erty rights as effectively as though they were the paramount object of the
action, and hence the court had jurisdiction of those rights, and may on motion
reconsider their decree. Lima v. Lima, supra. Pennsylvania is also in accord,
holding that the lack of due process rendered the whole proceedings void ab
initio, and that the .decree may be set aside on a motion to vacate the decree.
Gambe z. Gambe, supra.
The decision in the principal case is clearly in accord with the majority
rule in respect to the right to set aside the decree. As to the mode of pro-
cedure, while it is largely a matter of the practice of the particular state, it
is submitted that where the decree is void a motion to set it aside is a propeir
remedy.
FIXTURES-TITLE TO RAILS-AANDONMENT or EASEMENT-The defend-
ant purchased land over which ran a right of way for the use of a tramway.
Inasmuch as the tramway had not been used for a long time, the defendant
removed the rails upon the assumption that the right of way had been aban-
doned. This was an action of detinue for the rails. Held: Judgment for plain-
tiff. Talley v. Drumheller, 13o S. E. 385 (Va., 1925).
The general rule is that when personalty is affixed to the soil it becomes
part of the realty. But there is considerable conflict of authority as to whether
this rule is applicable to railroad tracks laid upon an easement. Some juris-
dictions hold that, as a matter of law, rails laid on land by virtue of an easement
are fixtures, and that the general rule obtains. Union Trust Co. v. Weber, 96
Ill. 346 (x88o) ; Bedford, etc., Co. v. Omnan, 115 Ky. 369, 73 S. NV. 1038 (1903) ;
Northern Pacific R. R. v. Carland, 5 Mont. 146, 3 Pac. 134 (1884). Others,
adhering to the general rule, regard the question of whether they have become
fixtures as one of fact for the jury. St. Louis & S. F. R. R. v. Beadle, 6 Kan.
App. 922, 50 Pac. 988 (1897) ; Helena & L. Smelting Co. v. Northern P. R. R.,
62 Mont. 281, 2o.5 Pac. 224 (1922) ; Van Keuren v. Central R. R., 38 N. J. L
x65 (1875). A contrary rule is applied in certain jurisdictions, where it is
held that the intention of the parties, rather than the fact of affixation, is
the determining factor in deciding whether rails are personalty or realty, even
though annexed to the soil. Thus it is held that, when tracks are laid upon a
right of way, the intention of the parties is not that the rails shall merge in
the realty, but that they shall be incidental to the use of the easement, and
hence that the owner of the right of way may, as in the instant case, remove
them at will. Wiggins Ferry Co. v. 0. M. R. R., 142 U. S. 396 (891) ; Wag-
ner v. Cleveland, etc. R. R., 22 Ohio 563 (1872) ; Justice v. Nesquehontng, etc.
R. R., 87 Pa. 28 (1878). In one case, the same conclusion has been reached
by regarding rails as trade fixtures, and, as such, subject to that exception to
the general rule. Northern Central R. R. v. Canton Co., 30 Md. 347 (x869).
It is submitted that the rule which makes the intention of the parties the
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criterion, in deciding whether a chattel affixed to the soil is to be regarded as
a fixture, is an unjustified extension upon the common law rule. Clearly, when
annexation has been effected, the character of the chattel merges with the realty,
but this fact, even under the old rule, could work no hardship since by contract
the right of removal could be retained when the annexation was intended
merely to be temporary.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-VALIDITY OF SEPARATION AcaaEMENTs-A husband
and wife agreed to separate, the husband to execute a deed for his interest in
their home to his wife, she to pay him $5oo to be raised by a mortgage on
the dwelling, in which he agreed to join. The parties never separated. Suit
by the wife six months later for specific performance. Held: Not granted.
Beck v. Beck, 131 Ad. 52o (N. J. Eq., 1925).
The old common law rule was that separation agreements were not en-
forceable because they were considered contrary to public policy. See cases
cited in 12 E. R. C. 814. These agreements are now generally upheld, on the
ground that they are the better of two evils--divorce or separation. Walker
v. Walker, 9 Wall. 743 (U. S., 1869) ; Bailey v. Dillon, 186 Mass. 244, 71 N. E.
538 (igo5) ; Singer's Estate, 233 Pa. 55, 81 Ad. 898 (1911). Contra: Hill v.
Hill, 74 N. H. 288, 67 At. 406 (i9o7). See 2 N. CAP- L. REv. 192 (1924).
Some courts, with a view to the contractual incapacity of a married woman
at common law, require the presence of a trustee in order to validate a contract
between husband and wife. Stephanson v. Osbone, 41 Miss. 119 (1866);
Stebbins v. Morris, i9 Mont. 115, 47 Pac. 642 (1896) ; Poillon '. Poillon, 49
App. Div. 341, 63 N. Y. Supp. 301 (igoo). The better and modern rule is
opposed, however, in view of statutes enabling married women to contract.
Jones v. Clifton, ioi U. S. 225 (1879) ; Bowers v. Hutchinson, 67 Ark. 15, 53
S. W. 399 (1899); Commonwealth v. Richards, 131 Pa. 2o9 18 At. 1007
(1889). But all courts concur in the view that such an agreement is valid
only when made with regard to a separation which has already occurred, or
which is to occur immediately, and not in reference to a possible future separa-
tion. Fox v. Davis, 113 Mass. 255 (1873) ; Clark v. Fosdick, ii8 N. Y. 7, 22
N. E. iII! (1889); Commonwealth v. Richards, supra.
And so, also, agreements to separate, if they are the result of mere mu-
tual volition or caprice, or a reckless disregard of marital obligations and
without any moving cause, will not be enforceable. Boland v. O'Neil, supra;
Stebbins v. forris, supra. But see Daniels v. Benedict, 97 Fed. 367, 379 (C.
C. A., 1899). It is submitted that the decision in the instant case, therefore, is
in accord with sound reasoning and public policy.
INSURANCE-INsURABLE INTEREST OF HUSBAND IN WIFE'S PRoPTY-1-The
plaintiff took out, in his own name, a fire insurance policy on a barn belonging
to his wife. Held: He had sufficient interest to permit recovery. Wash. Fire
Relief Assn. v. Albro, 241 Pac. 356 (Wash., 1925).
Early in the law of fire insurance it was required that the holder of a policy
have an interest in the property insured. Attempts to define that interest have
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been a powerful stimulus to judicial ingefiuity, but it is now rather generally
accepted that the policy holder must stand in some jural relation to the prop-
erty insured, although there is language in many cases, including the principal
case, to the effect that a mere concern in the property is enough.
At common law, where the husband had the right of curtesy initiate in
his wife's property, he unquestionably had an insurable interest in her property.
In the states in this country when curtesy prevailed this was the rule. Mutual
Fire Ins. Co. -'. Deale, 18 IMd. 26 (1861) ; Doyle v. American Fire Ins. Co.,
181 Mass. 139, 63 N. E. 394 (1902) ; Trade Ins. Co. v. Barracliff, 45 N J. L.
543 (1883); Webster v. Dwelling House Ins. Co., 53 Ohio, 558, 42 N. E. 546
(x895).
Where curtesy has been abolished, the rule is, as would be expected, that
the husband no longer has an insurable interest in his wife's property, since
he no longer stands in any jural relation to that property. Planters' Ins. Co.
v. Lloyd, 71 Ark. 292, 75 S. W. 725 (i9o3) ; Traders' Ins. Co. . Newman, i2o
Ind. 554, 22 N. E. 428 (i889) ; Clark v. Dwelling House Ins. Co., 8I Me 373,
17 Atl. 303 (1889); Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Montague, 38 Mich. 548 (1878);
Bassett v. Ins. Co.. 85 Neb. 85, i--2 N. W. 703 (i9o9).
it happens that the state of Washington has abolished curtesy. Laws Wash.
1875, p. 55, § 3. Thus it would seem at first blush that the decision in the
principal case has turned directly against the tide of authority by allowing the
husband an insurable interest where the legislature has abolished his curtesy
right The opinion proceeds on the theory, however, that an agency relation-
ship existed, and that the husband was acting for the wife in insuring her
property.
In seeking light from this quarter, the court in the instant case is in accord
with a distinct tendency. The courts have frequently been ready to find an
agency relationship even where the evidence was slight- Hunt zt. Mercantile
Ins. Co., 22 Fed. 503 (C. C., 1884) ; Anterican Cent. Ins. Co. v. McLanathan.
i, Kan. 533 (1873) ; Miotke v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co., 113 Mich. 166,
71 N. W. 463 (1897) ; Trade Ins. Co. z. Barracliff, supra; Harris v. York Mut.
Ins. Co., 50 Pa. 341 (1865).
SALEs-RIGHT OF INSPECTION-REATION TO PASSAGE OF TiTLE-Defendant
manufacturer of Norfolk, Va., contracted to sell plaintiff a certain quality of
staves and headings, shipment to be f. o. b. Norfolk, payment in thirty days.
Shipments were made on plaintiff's order to customers in various places, and
when the goods reached their destination, they were inspected and rejected as
being of inferior quality. Held: The title which passed to the buyer at time of
delivery of merchandise f. o. b. Norfolk was a conditional title, subject to
right of inspection and rejection of merchandise at point of destination. Struth-
ers-Ziegler Co. v. Farmer's Alfg. Co., 2o6 N. WV. 331 (Mich., 1925).
It is a general rule that where goods of a specific quality are ordered,
which the seller undertakes to deliver to a carrier for delivery to the buyer
at a distant place, the right of inspection, in the absence of any specific pro-
vision in the contract, continues until the goods are received and accepted at
their ultimate destination. The title passes upon delivery to the carrier sub-
RECENT CASES
ject to this right, of which the purchaser may or may not avail himself. Pope
V. Allis, 1i5 U. S. 363 (1885) ; Pierson v. Crooks, 115 N. Y. 539, 22 N. E. 349
(1889) ; Fogel v. Brubaker, 122 Pa. 7, I5 At]. 692 (S88). The courts reason
that it is not the duty of the purchaser to go to the point where delivery is
made to the carrier for inspection of the articles before their shipment, for he
has a right to rely on the good faith of the seller who has undertaken to fill
his order according to its terms. The first practicable opportunity for such
examination is at the time the goods reach the purchaser; and since there is
no express provision as to the right of inspection, this would seem to be the
time contemplated by the parties.
Lawder Co. v. Mackie Grocery Co., 97 Mhd. I, 54 At!. 634 (1903), would
seem to be opposed to the instant case, but the court distinguished the cases
on the ground that in the former the payment was cash rather than on credit,
and for this reason the right of inspection existed only until the seller's deliv-
ery to the carrier. It is submitted that this distinction is unsatisfactory; the
provision that the sale is for cash or on credit affects only the passage of
title, and is not a factor controlling the duration of the right of inspection.
No strict rule n'ay be formulated as to the time and place of inspection of
goods contracted to be shipped f. o. b. The form of the contract, the nature
of the goods, the intention of the parties, etc., are the determining factors in
each case. The decision in the instant case seems tound. inasmuch as there is
nothing in the contracts inconsistent with the buyer's right of inspection at the
point of destination.
WILLS-CONDITIONS-EFFEcT OF PROVISION FOR FoRFa TRE-The testa-
trix left a legacy to the defendant, and provided else.here ,ku her will that
if any legatee should contest it, his legacy would be revokcd and would then
become a part of the residue of her estate. The defendant opposed probate
of the will in good faith and upon probable cause, but without success, and
the plaintiff as executor petitioned the court for a ruling on the question as
to whether the defendant had forfeited his legacy. Held: No forfeiture. In
re Keenan's Will, 2o5 N. W. iooz (Wis., 1925).
The classic attitude toward the problem involved in the present case is to
distinguish between real and personal estate, and to regard a condition for for-
feiture of a legacy in case of a contest, without any gift over. as being merely
in terrorern and consequently ineffectual to deprive the contestant of his legacy.
Morris v. Burroughs, I Atk. 399 (Eng., 1737); Matter of Arrowsmith, 162
App. Div. 623, 147 N. Y. Supp. ioi6 (1914), aff'd 213 N. Y. 704, io8 N. E.
io89 (i95) ; Fifield v. Van Wyck, 94 Va. 557, 27 S. E. 446 (1897). Where,
however, the testator has made a valid gift over, the contesting legatee will
incur a forfeiture. CIcaver v. Spurling, 2 P. XVms.. 526 (Eng., 172"9) ; Smith-
sonian Instititlon v. Meech, x69 U. S. 398 (1898). This doctrine is not applied
in the case of real estate, and a condition that a devisee who contests the will
shall forfeit his devise is valid whether or not there is a devise over. Cooke
v. Turner, IS M. & W. 727 (Eng., 1846); Hoit v. Hoit, 42 N. J. Eq. .388, 7 AtI.
856 (x886) ; Whitehurst . Gotwtalt, I89 N. C. 577, 127 S. F_. 582 (1925). Cf.
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Sackett v. Mallory, I Mete. 355 (Mass., i84o). But cf. Chew's Appeal, 45 Pa.
228 (1863) ; Cochran v. Cochran, 127 Pa. 486, 17 Atl. 981 (1889).
A number of American jurisdictions have refused to recognize the dis-
tinction between realty and personalty, on the ground of its having no sub-
stantial foundation, and consider forfeiture clauses applying to legacies without
a gift over as effective as those applying to devises. Estate of Hite, i5s Cal.
436, iOi Pac. 443 (19o9); Moran v. Moran, 144 Iowa, 45!, 123 N. W. 2o2
(i9o9) ; Bradford v. Bradford, ig Ohio 546 (i869). See South Norwalk Trust
Co. v. St. John, 92 Conn. 168, 174, io0 Atl. 961, 962 (917). The tendency
of the courts, however, is to hold that a beneficiary who contests with proba-
bilis causa litigandi will not be visited with an application of the testator's
forfeiture clause. South Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. John, supra; Friend's Es-
tate, 209 Pa. 442, 58 Atl. 853 (1o94); Tate v. Camp, 147 Tenn. 137, 245 S.
W. 839 (19=-). Contra: Estate of Miller, 156 Cal. zi9, IO3 Pac. 842 (199) ;
Moran v. M oran, supra. Cf. Smfthsonian Institution v. Meach, supra. It is sub-
mitted that this view, with which In re Keenan's IViII, supra, is in accord,
properly safeguards the interest of a legatee or devisee who makes an honest
and reasonable attack on a will which he believes not to be that of the alleged
testator, without in any way thwarting the natural desire of the latter to
withhold his bounty from one in whom frivolity or guile is the actuating
motive for the contest.
